Parameters of the model are matched to data taken from the U.S. and from the EMU's 11 member countries. These parameters are then used to calculate the optimal reaction coefficients of closed and open economy monetary policy rules under both a cooperative and a non cooperative setting. The results of the paper show that, under most policy rules, the EMU has worse macroeconomic performance. Despite the overall worse performance, the results show that the EMU can gain from using policy rules that include external variables, as well as through policy cooperation. The model also confirms that the fundamental sources of the worse performance lie in the higher inflation persistence, the greater volatility of shocks and the greater openness of the EMU economies. Since all three of these sources are likely to witness substantial change following the adoption of the single currency and the creation of the European Central Bank, the results point to a more symmetric monetary policy relationship between the U.S. and the EMU in the future.
Introduction
The recent creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Central Bank (ECB) has spawned numerous papers in a variety of research areas. Selected examples include work by Rudebusch & Svensson (1999b) critiquing the objectives of the ECB, work by Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998) quantifying the differences in the transmission mechanism across the EMU countries, work by Rose(1999) studying the impact of the Euro on EMU trade flows, and work by Chinn (2000) on understanding the rapid depreciation of the Euro in the past year.
The resurgent line of research on the performance of monetary policy rules has also been extended to understanding the behavior of the ECB. Foundational work by Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) used simple policy rules to characterize the behavior of monetary policy makers in Germany, France and Italy before the creation of the EMU. More recent work by Taylor (1999) , Peersmann & Smets (1999) and Gerlach & Schnabel (1999) has examined interest rate setting and economic performance in the EMU economy using simple monetary policy rules.
Although these papers have looked at monetary policy making within the EMU, relatively little work has been done on understanding the monetary policy interactions between the ECB and the Federal Reserve. In fact, most papers on U.S. monetary policy work from a closed economy perspective. The assumption that the U.S. is a relatively closed economy is, of course, hardly controversial: in the modern era, no other country has appeared to be large enough for its macroeconomic fortunes to command serious consideration by the Federal Reserve. However, the East Asian economic crisis in 1997 showed that events that affect an entire region can affect the U.S. economy, even if no individual country in that region is large enough to warrant consideration by U.S. policy makers. Events unfolding in East Asia seemed to be among the principal driving forces behind policy decisions undertaken by the Federal Reserve in the latter part of 1997 and in 1998.
Given the impact of East Asia's economic woes on the decisions of U.S. monetary policy makers, the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) can potentially be of significance for U.S. monetary policy makers. The, by now well-documented, steps towards macroeconomic convergence in the EMU member countries means that the EMU represents the creation of a single "country" similar in size to the U.S., with an influential single monetary policy maker and a currency that can eventually rival the dollar in international financial markets. 1 Similarly, policy decisions of the U.S. Federal Reserve can have, and seem to have already had, important consequences for the European Central Bank. Over the last year, the rapid growth of the U.S. economy and the accompanying tightening by the Federal Reserve have contributed to the substantial depreciation of the euro. The ECB has reacted to the falling euro by raising interest rates despite the fact that some of the largest economies in the region are struggling to grow. This paper takes a closer look at the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Band (ECB) using a two country version of a macroeconomic model used by Svensson (2000) to study small open economies. Such a model is well suited for studying the 1 Or at least it seemed so at the outset! relationship between the United States and the EMU because of the presence of a single policy maker in the European Central Bank. Parameters of the model are matched to data taken from the U.S. and from the EMU's 11 member countries. These parameters are then used to calculate the optimal reaction coefficients of closed and open economy monetary policy rules under both a cooperative and a non cooperative setting.
The results show that, under most policy rules, the EMU has worse macroeconomic performance. Despite the overall worse performance, the results show that the EMU can gain from using policy rules that include external variables, as well as through policy cooperation. The model also confirms that the fundamental sources of the worse performance lie in the higher inflation persistence, the greater volatility of shocks and the greater openness of the EMU economies. Since all three of these sources are likely to witness substantial change following the adoption of the single currency and the creation of the European Central Bank, the results point to a more symmetric monetary policy relationship between the U.S. and the EMU in the near future.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the model and its underlying assumptions. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation of the parameters of the model. Sections 4 and 5 discuss how to calculate the performance of the different policy rules and provides results and analysis for the Non-Cooperative and the Cooperative cases respectively. Section 6 concludes.
Description of the Model
The model is a two country open economy extension of a simple, rational expectations model of the macroeconomy presented by Svensson (2000) , Rotemberg & Woodford (1997) and Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) . The model is mostly derived from micro foundations of optimizing consumers and profit maximizing, monopolistically competitive firms. However, it does contain ad hoc assumptions about the partial adjustment of prices and output. The model consists of three main equations: an equation describing exchange rate behavior, a demand equation and a price adjustment equation.
Only an outline of the main equations of the model is provided here: details of the derivation of individual segments of the model can be found in Weerapana (1999).
Exchange Rate Determination
In describing the model, I will use the terms Home and Foreign to refer to the two countries.
The nominal exchange rate is expressed in terms of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency.
Therefore, the real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of Foreign goods.
The dynamics of the nominal exchange rate are modeled, following the standard practice in the literature, as satisfying the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIRP) Relationship, allowing for the existence of risk premia. 2 The UIRP equation can be rewritten for the real exchange rate (in terms of deviations from the mean) as the following: 3
In this equation Home and Foreign prices are measured as percentage deviations from constant trends while the nominal exchange rate is measured as the percentage deviation from a trend which is the difference between the trend domestic and foreign price levels. Also, ϕ t denotes the risk premium, which is assumed to follow a simple AR(1) form given by ϕ t = γ ϕ ϕ t−1 + ϕ t .
Aggregate Demand Equations
The aggregate demand equations are derived from utility maximizing consumers who have an intertemporal CES utility function with intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ over a composite consumption good. The composite good is a Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence aggregate function of composite Home goods and composite Foreign goods with elasticity of substitution θ between the two types.
The prices of these goods are given by p h and p f respectively.
Given such a setup, the aggregate demands for Home and Foreign goods can be derived from the appropriate Euler equations, and expressed in deviations terms as:
In the above equations ω is the share of Foreign goods in the composite consumption good
while ρ is what Svensson (2000) refers to as an "infinite horizon market discount factor", defined
t+τ where r h t is the short term domestic inflation real interest rate. These equations specify that aggregate demand is negatively related to both the Home and Foreign discount factors.
The equations also reveal the complicated, and seemingly ambiguous, impact of the real exchange rate on aggregate demand. On the one hand, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, q t , increases the relative price of Foreign goods. This leads to a higher demand for Home goods, and a lower demand for Foreign goods, by consumers in both countries. On the other hand, since q reverts back to the mean in the long run, a current depreciation results in expected future appreciation of the real exchange rate. This will lead to a decrease in expected CPI inflation in the Home country and an increase in expected CPI inflation in the Foreign country. All else equal, these changes raise the expected future CPI real interest rate in the Home country and lower it in the Foreign country, do not apply to a risk premium adjusted form of UIRP, and it remains one of the more satisfactory ways of describing exchange rate dynamics.
3 In order to keep the notation informative, superscript h is used for the Home country and superscript f for the Foreign country. Small letters are used to indicate the natural log of a variable. An asterisk is used to denote the value of a variable in the Foreign country. So p f is the (log) price of Foreign goods in the Home country but p f * is the (log) price of Foreign goods in the Foreign country.
thus reducing Home consumption, and raising Foreign consumption, of both goods.
The net impact of these two changes, however, is usually positive because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ (typically < 1) is smaller than the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods, θ (typically ≥ 1). In that case a depreciation of the Home currency against the Foreign currency raises aggregate demand for Home goods and lowers aggregate demand for Foreign goods.
An unfortunate feature of these optimization based macroeconomic models is their inability to replicate the dynamics of the data as well as a purely backward-looking model like a VAR. 4 On the other hand, as pointed out in Fuhrer (1997), a forward-looking, rational expectations model is much less vulnerable to the Lucas Critique than a purely backward-looking model. A possible compromise then is to follow Svensson (2000) and incorporate lagged adjustment terms into the model in an ad hoc manner. This can be viewed as a necessary evil required to match an optimization based model to the data.
Aggregate demand is assumed to be determined one period ahead, and to adjust only partially from one period to the next. This leads to the following equations in which β y denotes the degree of adjustment:
where the reduced form parameters in the above equations are related to the structural parameters of the model according to the following relationships:
The reduced form of the model is written so that each of the β coefficients takes on a positive value. Therefore, the long horizon discount factors, both at home and abroad reduce the demand for Home goods while depreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the demand for Foreign goods and increases the demand for Home goods.
Price Adjustment Equations
Both Home and Foreign economies have a continuum of goods and producers that runs from zero to one. Each producer, indexed by i, faces a downward sloping demand curve with elasticity ν.
Following convention among papers in this area, prices are assumed to be set according to the staggered price-setting model of Taylor (1980) . In particular, it is assumed, as in Akerlof & Yellen (1991) and Yun (1996) , that firms maximize profits taking this staggered price-setting constraint into account. The model follows Calvo (1983) in incorporating staggered price setting by assuming that each producer is free to change prices only with probability (1 − α) in a given period. A producer setting a price at period t must consider the possibility that she may never be able to change the price again. The solution to her price setting decision 5 is the following expression
In this equation π h t is quarterly domestic inflation defined as p h t − p h t−1 , γ is the share of Foreign inputs in the production of Home goods,ṽ is the elasticity of the input requirement function ν(.) with respect to demand, and ξ =
is a function of the above described structural parameters of the model, where δ is the discount rate. This equation relates domestic price inflation to the demand for goods by consumers, expectations of future price changes and the real exchange rate.
We assume that the producer sets the price of her goods in domestic currency; the price of that good in the foreign market is then determined by the prevailing exchange rate. This assumption is clearly more realistic for U.S. producers than for EMU producers. Even though an attempt is made to control for imperfect pass-through in subsequent applications of the model, it is important to remember that the microeconomic foundations of the model do not incorporate producers who explicitly price discriminate between the domestic and foreign markets.
Domestic inflation is assumed to be predetermined two periods in advance, i.e. that there is a two period lag in the effect of policy on domestic inflation. This is a standard assumption made by both Svensson (2000) and Ball (1997) , based on the empirical observation that the impact of monetary policy on domestic inflation occurs with a longer lag than does its impact on output. In this model, changes in monetary policy affect domestic inflation primarily through the aggregate demand channel. Since aggregate demand is predetermined by one period, inflation is therefore assumed to be predetermined by two periods.
In addition, as in the demand equations, partial adjustment of prices is assumed for empirical estimation purposes resulting in the following price adjustment equation:
The corresponding price-adjustment equation for the Foreign country is given by
5 Once again details of the derivation are omitted here and can be found in Weerapana (1999).
The relationships between the structural parameters and the reduced form parameters are:
The general structure of the price adjustment equation can be summarized as follows.
Domestic inflation is affected by the previous period's inflation because of the assumed inertia of inflation. It is also affected by expectations of future inflation because of the optimization problem faced by producers under staggered price setting. As expected, higher demand for goods and services will increase the prices of goods while the expected depreciation of the real exchange rate will raise the cost of inputs and increase domestic inflation in the Home country. 6 This concludes the layout of the basic model, typical in that it has a forward-looking 
State-Space Representation
The main equations of the model can be summarized by the following equations, rewritten in a format appropriate for a state-space representation:
(10)
In the above system, equations (5) and (6) are the aggregate demand equations and equations (7) and (8) are the price adjustment equations. Equation (11) is the UIRP relationship that describes the behavior of the real exchange rate. Equation (12) describes the AR(1) representation of the risk premium. Equations (9) and (10) are recursive definitions of the infinite-horizon discount factors for the Home and Foreign economies.
The next step is to obtain a compact reduced form representation of the dynamic path of the economy. The variables for the Home economy are categorized into 2 groups, X t , the set of predetermined state variables, and x t , the set of forward-looking variables, which are variables whose current value will be affected by current decisions of the policy maker. The forward-looking variables in this system are the real exchange rate (q t ), the infinite horizon discount rate (ρ t ) and agents' expectations at time t about inflation three periods hence (E t π h t+3 ). The variables for the Foreign economy are categorized similarly: the two categories are labeled X * t and x * t , respectively. The categorization of the variables in the system is as follows:
By defining the following terms,
the dynamic path of the economy can be described as follows:
In this equationÛ t = [i t , i * t ] is the vector of choice variables and
is a vector of variables that are functions of the forward-looking variables and the state variables.
The entries of the Λ matrices are functions of the reduced form coefficients of the model. This system is simplified to obtain the following representation of the dynamic path of the economy: 7
7 Details of these derivations and the definitions of the Λ matrices and the matrices A, B, B F and Υ are provided in the appendix.
Specifying the Behavior of the Monetary Policy Maker
Policy makers are assumed to have a loss function of the form: 8
The loss function does not incorporate foreign variables; the policy maker's concern about foreign variables is for purely selfish reasons. She does not care about the welfare of the other economy or about potentially beneficial externalities of her actions on other countries, unless there are repercussions for the domestic economy. For simplicity, the policy maker is assumed to care equally about output gap fluctuations and about inflation fluctuations. Each policy maker is also assumed to care somewhat about the volatility of interest rates by adding an interest rate volatility term with a lower weight to the loss function.
The smoothing term is added to capture some realism; in its absence the model will tend to generate considerable fluctuations in interest rates as the policy maker attempts to ward off the negative impacts of exchange rate fluctuations, for example. In a world with equity markets that are highly sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, excessive interest rate volatility will generate adverse macroeconomic outcomes. Given that asset markets are omitted from this model for analytical convenience, one way to introduce realism into the model is to directly incorporate the smoothing term into the policy maker's loss function.
The international dimension of monetary policy becomes important because of the presence of the CPI inflation term in the loss function. The definition of CPI inflation,
shows how movements in the exchange rate directly affect the rate of CPI inflation. If the policy maker had the ability to directly control exchange rates then she would have a direct channel through which she could easily control inflation. Although the policy maker does have some ability to influence the exchange rate by changing nominal interest rates, her ability to move the exchange rate to a desired level depends on expectations remaining static. Therefore, the nominal interest rate serves as the policy tool with exchange rate movements having a potentially important impact on the loss function of the policy maker.
Incomplete Pass-Through
Given the general volatility of exchange rates, one modeling issue is whether fluctuations in exchange rates will automatically translate into fluctuations in import prices (and by extension into fluctuations in CPI inflation). If so, open economy policy rules, in which the policy maker reacts to the real exchange rate, are likely to yield substantial improvement in performance over closed economy policy rules. In the United States, in particular, empirical evidence suggests that pass-through is less than complete: 9 the U.S. CPI is much more stable in the face of exchange rate fluctuations than the CPI in the model would be under complete pass-through. While pass-through is likely to be higher in Europe, the extent of pass-through may diminish as more goods are priced in terms of the Euro. 10 A correction to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on CPI inflation seems necessary before proceeding with the application of the model. 11
This paper tries to incorporate a workable treatment of imperfect exchange rate passthrough. This allows for better analysis of the policy decisions of the Federal Reserve, which sets monetary policy for a country that is relatively isolated from exchange rate fluctuations because of the special role of the dollar in international financial markets. Under incomplete pass-through not all of the shocks to exchange rates cause fluctuations in the domestic prices of imports. The definition of the CPI is changed so that
Similarly the CPI in the foreign country is being re-expressed as
Note that in the case of complete exchange rate pass-through, ψ = 1, the CPI equations collapse down to the standard casesπ
Values of ψ, which measure the impact of a change in the exchange rate on the domestic currency price of imports, vary widely across countries. These values also vary depending on the definition of a period: long horizon values (longer than a year) are close to one while short horizon values (a quarter or two) are near zero. 12 Note that this adjustment of the CPI to account for incomplete pass-through reduces the impact of exchange rates on CPI inflation and therefore makes it less obvious that a policy rule that involves reacting to exchange rate fluctuations would necessarily yield better performance.
9 See Knetter (1993). 10 See the recent work by Devereux, Engel & Tille (2000) for an interesting analysis of how macroeconomic fluctuations in the EMU should fall following the adoption of the Euro. 11 The first best solution is to build pricing to market into the microfoundations of the model. 12 I am grateful to Phong Trinh for providing me with a very useful summary of the empirical estimates of passthrough coefficients found in the literature.
The Role of the European Central Bank
As the EMU approaches the completion of its second year of existence there is still some uncertainty about the ECB and its conduct of monetary policy. Among the important unresolved issues are the impact of the Euro depreciation on the policy decisions of the ECB, the asymmetric transmission mechanism from the policy tool to the economies of the member countries, the voting behavior of the board members when faced with a genuine regional asymmetry and the role of the monetary targeting "pillar" of ECB policy making. 13 The behavior of the ECB is modeled as following simple monetary policy rules where a shortterm interest rate is changed in response to fluctuations in European averages of macroeconomic variables. Similarly, the loss function of the ECB is assumed to contain EMU wide averages of macroeconomic variables as "goal variables", i.e. variables that the ECB tries to reduce fluctuations in. The use of European averages as goal variables in the loss function and as reaction variables in the policy rule may produce misleading results if regional politics excessively influence ECB policy making. For example, the votes of ECB board members may be overly sensitive to their own countries' economic conditions instead of being based upon the conditions of the EMU as a whole.
However, the ECB themselves release statistics for the EMU region as a whole calculated in this fashion; furthermore its communiques have cited these constructed numbers at least conveying the impression that there is an EMU focus in setting monetary policy.
Data and Estimation
The data series used for estimating the model are basic macroeconomic series: GDP, long-term interest rates, nominal exchange rates and GDP deflators. The sample period is 1981:1 to 1998:4 and the frequency is quarterly. This avoids the turbulent periods of the late 1970's. 14 One important concern is the usefulness of pre-EMU data for answering hypothetical questions about post-EMU situations. 15 Several papers that seek to resolve some of the uncertainty surrounding EMU, make use of pre-EMU data. This paper chooses to follow authors such as Dornbusch et al (1998) , who use data from 1985 to estimate reaction functions and transmission equations for each of the individual countries and Gerlach & Schnabel (1998) , who use weighted data from the 11 EMU countries to show that Taylor rules seem to describe interest rate setting in the European region as a whole. This paper follows along in that aggregated pre-EMU data was used in the estimation, keeping in mind that structural change was likely to be significant.
Pre-EMU data were aggregated according to the OECD weights used by Gerlach & Schnabel (1998) . 16 Summary statistics for the basic series are given in Table 1 . The output gap is calculated 13 Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998) discuss some of the issues that the ECB faces and Feldstein (2000) provides a useful update of the track record of the ECB in its early years of existence.
14 Further details about the specific series used can be found in the appendix. 15 The lifespan of the EMU is too short to constitute a useful sample size. 16 The 
Estimation of the Demand Side
The equations to be estimated can be rewritten in a format that clarifies which instruments are suitable for GMM estimation:
The reduced form parameters share common structural parameters; these within equation restrictions are explicitly incorporated into the estimation. Since output is predetermined one period and expectations are assumed to be rational, the expressions in the square brackets in the two equations should be uncorrelated with information available at time t-1. This suggests several logical instrument choices for estimation and the results are reported in Tables 2 and 3 . 17 The results reported are for equation-by-equation estimation; imposing cross-equation restrictions changes the 17 θ is fixed at a value of 1 for estimation purposes. Import shares ω = .11 and ω * = 0.14 were calculated from data taken from the IMF's "Direction of International Trade Statistics Yearbook". Intra-EMU trade was excluded in calculating the import share for the EMU. basic conclusions little.
Damage Control: Salvaging the Demand Parameters
The above results show that the only parameters of the model estimated to a reasonable degree of precision are the adjustment parameters. Given their large standard errors, the central values of the other parameters are not used to calculate the performance of policy rules. Instead, the estimated values of the adjustment parameters are combined with non controversial values for the elasticity of substitution (both intertemporal and across goods) to recover the remaining demand parameters. For expositional ease, the relationships between the reduced form parameters and the underlying structural parameters are summarized below:
Annual time series data is used to calculate the import shares for the U.S. and the EMU 11, ω = 10.86% and ω * = 14.34%. 18 Assuming non controversial values for the intertemporal elasticities of substitution, σ = σ * = 0.66, and for the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods, θ = θ * = 1, the values reported in Table 4 are calculated for the other reduced form parameters:
These numbers do not contradict reasonable priors about their values. An expected change of 1% in the interest rate reduces the output gap in the next period by 0.14% in the U.S. and 0.09% in the EMU. 19 
Estimation of the Supply Side
The supply side equations are as follows:
Since inflation is predetermined two periods ahead and expectations are assumed to be rational, the expressions in the square brackets in the two equations should be uncorrelated with information available at time t-2. The resulting parameter estimates are given in Tables 5 and 6 .
Damage Control II: The Supply Side Parameters
The supply side presents more complications than the demand side. Once again, for expositional ease, the relationships between the reduced form parameters and the underlying structural parameters are summarized below:
Empirical estimates for α π and α * π are taken from the GMM estimations. The share of imported inputs γ and γ * are set equal to the respective import shares. Values of the remaining parameters are obtained from the discussion by Rotemberg & Woodford (1997) , who in turn survey a wide range of articles to obtain reasonable values for structural parameters. The discount rate δ is set to 0.99. The parameter α (the probability that a firm is unable to change prices in the Calvo adjustment mechanism) is set to 0.5, implying that the average price is fixed for 2 quarters, a conservative choice from among the several possible values discussed by Rotemberg & Woodford.
The elasticity of the demand curve faced by producers, ν, is set to 5, which implies a 20% mark up above marginal cost by the monopolistically competitive producers. Finally,ṽ is set to 1.66, a value chosen by Rotemberg & Woodford to obtain a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1. Using these assumed parameter values and the estimated persistence parameters produces the values reported in Table 7 for the other reduced form parameters:
The persistence of inflation in Europe is higher than in the U.S. Also recall that expected future inflation also enters the equation with a coefficient of (1 − α π ). This means that the model predicts that producers in the U.S. attach more weight to expected inflation, relative to past inflation, than producers in Europe. Given the various countries' relative inflation histories, this seems an entirely reasonable outcome.
Shocks
Measures of the variances of y , y * , π and π * : the shocks to the four aggregate demand and price adjustment equations described in the previous section are also required. 20 Using the residuals from the GMM estimation, gives the following measures for the standard deviations of the shocks that hit inflation and output: 21 Std.Dev( y ) = σ y = 0.7041% (Output shock -U.S) Std.Dev( π ) = σ π = 0.7268% (Domestic Inflation shock -U.S) 20 Note that I do not need to identify the structural shocks that hit the economy. The analysis only requires the variances of the reduced form disturbances. 21 Rudebusch & Svensson(1999a) estimate output shocks with a standard deviation of 0.80% and inflation shocks of 1% for the U.S. for a longer period including the volatile 60's and 70's.
Std.Dev( y * ) = σ y * = 0.5956% (Output shock -EMU)
Given the somewhat doubtful fit of the model, the residuals obtained from the GMM estimation are compared to the residuals obtained from an unrestricted VAR, which has 3 lags to mop up any serial correlation in the error terms. The resulting estimates are fairly similar, except for a smaller output shock for the U.S. 22 A measure of the persistence of the risk premium, γ ϕ , and the variance of shocks to the exchange rate, ϕ are also required. Given the long history of failures to estimate uncovered interest rate parity equations, the risk premium is calculated directly, following Taylor(1993a) as
I then run the regression ϕ t = γ ϕ ϕ t−1 + ϕ t . Resulting estimates are γ ϕ =0.3107 and σ ϕ = 4.744%. This estimate of the standard deviation of the shocks to the exchange rate seems high, especially in comparison to the estimates of shocks to inflation and output. However, Taylor(1993a) finds even greater volatility for the risk premia in the nominal exchange rate between the U.S. and Germany, a standard deviation of 10%. 23 As discussed earlier, complete pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations would imply that the high volatility of exchange rate shocks translates directly into fluctuations in CPI inflation.
Recall that the corrected CPI's for the U.S. and the EMU were expressed as
Here ψ and ψ * are the incomplete pass-through coefficients for the United States and the EMU respectively. Following Taylor (1993a), values of ψ=0.10 and ψ * =0.18 are used for calculating the CPI. This allows for some asymmetry in the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the CPI's in the two countries. 24 22 I find that σy=0.5045, σy * =0.5904, σπ=0.6831, σπ * =0.8903. 23 One explanation for the magnitude of the shock to the exchange rate is that risk premium measures could be characterized as measures of our ignorance: they contain expectation errors, irrationality, mismeasurement and a host of other problems. 24 Taylor's results are for the U.S. and Germany: his estimates for France and Italy are higher (0.68 and 0.42 respectively) but given that the importance of the Euro is more likely to resemble the mark than the lira, I have chosen to use the German value of 0.18. These numbers are consistent with evidence from Feenstra & Kendall (1994) , who show that 85% of U.S. imports are invoiced in dollar terms, but differ from the annual micro level studies of a select group of industries by Knetter (1993), who finds that German exporters offset about 36% of exchange rate changes while U.S. exporters do not offset any such changes. Engel (1999) finds that prices in European countries are not "much influenced by changes in the nominal exchange rate in the short run". Once could also argue that as the Euro becomes more dominant a currency, the pass-through coefficient in the EMU could fall even more. However, the recent travails have cast doubt about any meteoric rise to prominence on the Euro's part.
Solving the Model: Non Cooperative Case
The parameter values given in Table 4 and Table 7 can then be used to calculate the relative performance of different types of monetary policy rules under both cooperative and non-cooperative conditions. Similar exercises comparing closed economy policy rules have been carried out in several papers using both forward and backward-looking models. 25 In the non-cooperative setting, each country's policy maker decides on the optimal reaction coefficients for a particular type of simple policy rule; given the actions of her counterpart who is also following a similar type of simple policy rule. 26 
Simple Policy Rules: Non-Cooperative Case
This section describes how to calculate the performance of various policy rules when the policy makers in the two countries do not cooperate. Each policy maker has an objective function defined only over her own country's variables and each controls only her own policy tools. The period loss functions for the Home and Foreign countries respectively are given by:
These objective functions can be defined in terms of the goal variables Y t and Y * t as L t = Y t KY t and L * t = Y * t KY * t where
The strategic interactions between the two policy makers must be factored into the calculation of the optimized simple policy rules. Each policy maker is assumed to be aware of the type of rule that the other is following. The adjustment process (possibly) leading to equilibrium is as follows. Taking the other's policy rule as given, the first policy maker searches over the coefficients of her own type of rule to find the best response. The second policy maker, anticipating this behavior, searches over the coefficients of her own rule to find the appropriate response to this new set of coefficients. This type of Cournot adjustment process is repeated until the coefficients in each feedback rule converge.
In order to search over the coefficients for the best performing rule, it is first necessary to calculate the loss function for each policy maker for a given set of feedback rules, i t = fX t and i * t = f * X t . The policy variables at time t+1, i t+1 = fX t+1 and i * t+1 = f * X t+1 , can then be collectively expressed asÛ t+1 =fX t+1 ≡ FẐ t+1 wherê
and F = fĝ . 27 Recall that the dynamic path of the economy is given by
By substituting inÛ t+1 = FẐ t+1 the path of the economy can be rewritten as
The dynamic path of the two economies can be separated out into two matrix equations, one for the forward-looking and one for the predetermined variables, by appropriately partitioning the matrices of reduced-form parameters so that
A feature of the solution to these types of models is that the forward-looking variables are endogenously determined functions of the state variables. So the forward-looking variables at time t+1 can be written as x t+1 = h t+1Xt+1 and x * t+1 = h * t+1X t+1 . This relationship can collectively be expressed asx t+1 = H t+1Xt+1 where
By substitutingx t+1 = H t+1Xt+1 andÛ t =fX t into the dynamic path of the economy, the relationship between the forward-looking variables and the predetermined variables for the two economies can be written as:
Given an initial value for H t+1 , the above equations can be iterated to solve for H t which describes the relationship between the forward-looking variables and the predetermined variables given the policy rules f and f * .
The remaining task is to show how to calculate the value of the loss function after calculating the values of h, h * that correspond to the given f and f * . 28 The dynamic path of the economy can now be written as
By partitioning the M matrix appropriately and using the fact thatx t = HX t , the dynamic path of the predetermined variables can be expressed aŝ
Let Σ υυ denote the variance-covariance matrix of Υυ t , which contains the reduced form variances of the shocks calculated from the data. Then the variance-covariance matrix of the predetermined variables is given by 29
The goal variables can be expressed as a function of the state variables in the system: 30 Y t = C zẐt + C uÛt and Y * t = C * zẐ t + C * uÛ t . These goal variables can be expressed as functions of the predetermined variables alone by using the fact thatx t = HX t andÛ t = fX t and by appropriately partitioning the matrices C z and C * z so that
Variances of the goal variables for the Home country and the Foreign country are given by
The value of the loss functions can then be easily calculated by appropriately weighting the variances of the goal variables.
Calculating the optimal reaction coefficients of a given type of simple policy rule is a straight- 28 Note that H can be appropriately partitioned to obtain the h matrices so that ht = H . 30 The matrices Cz, C * z , Cu and C * u are defined and derived in the appendix forward application of the above technique. Each policy maker searches over the coefficients of a particular type of policy rule taking the other policy maker's actions as given; each iteration of the search requires an application of the above solution technique. Once the best response rule has been found, the entire process is repeated to find the best response of the other policy maker to this new rule. This Cournot type adjustment process, where each policy maker calculates their best response to a given policy rule, is repeated until the two policy makers converge to their best response rule.
Results and Analysis
Four different simple policy rules are analyzed in this section; a simple Taylor Rule (Taylor 1993b) of the form i t = 1.5π t + 0.5y t and three optimized simple rules in which the policy maker is allowed to pick the reaction coefficients in a given type of simple policy rule so as to minimize the loss function. These optimized rules can be expressed in the following form:
These three optimized rules are an optimized Taylor rule, a policy rule in which the policy maker also reacts to foreign output and a rule in which the policy maker reacts to the real exchange rate. These rules will subsequently be referred to, both in the text and in the tables of results, as "Optimized Taylor Rule", "Open Economy Rule 1" and "Open Economy Rule 2" respectively.
In a non-cooperative setting, optimized simple rules, which result from a series of best response moves by policy makers, are the more relevant rules for analysis. For example, a situation where both countries follow a simple Taylor Rule is unlikely to be an equilibrium because of the incentive to search for a best response. The reaction coefficients of the three optimized simple rules in the non-cooperative case are provided in Table 8 and Table 9 .
The most striking features of the optimal Taylor Rule for both the U.S. and the EMU are the high reaction coefficients on domestic inflation. This result partially conforms to a common finding in the literature, namely, that Taylor Rules with reaction coefficients higher than 0.5 and 1.5 tend to perform better than the basic Taylor Rule. 31 The reaction coefficients on output yield mixed results. The policy maker in the U.S. is better off by following a rule with a reaction coefficient on output that is higher than 0.5. However, the EMU has much lower reaction coefficients on domestic output, in fact the reaction coefficients are negative. 32 Much of the gain relative to the simple Taylor 31 Note that the Taylor Rule as used here calls for a reaction coefficient of 1.5 on CPI inflation. The coefficients in the table decompose this reaction into reaction to domestic inflation and reaction to current and lagged values of the real exchange rate. There is no independent reaction to any of the exchange rate variables in the first 3 columns of Table 8 and Table 9 .
32 Although the negative coefficient seems highly unusual: calling for an easing of monetary policy when output is high, this result is due mostly to a flat objective function in the region which is being searched. Varying the reaction function on output to a small positive number does not change the results very much.
Rule in both the U.S. and the EMU is clearly driven by a stronger reaction to domestic inflation.
As in the case of the optimal Taylor Rule, the response coefficients in Open Economy Rule 1 and Open Economy Rule 2 for the EMU continue to differ from the coefficients for the U.S.
The EMU policy maker continues to react strongly to domestic inflation while ignoring output fluctuations. This result seems to be driven by the higher persistence of inflation in the EMU, which makes current inflation a more pertinent variable for policy makers to react to. The results for Open Economy Rule 1 and Open Economy Rule 2 show that the policy maker in the EMU seems to react more strongly to the external variables than the policy maker in the United States, which is not surprising given that the EMU is more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Table 10 compares the volatility of the goal variables and calculates the value of the loss function for each of the above rules. 33 The relative performance of the optimized rules shows that Open Economy Rule 1 yields an average performance gain of about 11% relative to a simple Taylor Rule while Open Economy Rule 2 yields about a 14% performance gain relative to the simple Taylor Rule. These performance gains are measured using the metric used to search for the optimal type of simple policy rule, namely the value of the policy maker's loss function. 34 If we choose to restrict our focus to inflation, we see an even more substantial gain: about 16% from reacting to foreign output and roughly about the same from reacting to the real exchange rate. Another way to interpret the gains from Open Economy Rule 2, is that, for the EMU, the volatility of output under the basic Taylor Rule would have to fall from a standard deviation of 1.02% to a standard deviation of 0.51%, roughly by one-half, in order to achieve comparable performance. The second feature of Table 10 is the asymmetry in economic performance. Regardless of the type of simple policy rule studied, the U.S performs substantially better than the EMU.
The most significant asymmetries between the two economies are possible culprits: namely the greater openness of the EMU, the higher persistence of inflation, the higher shocks to inflation and the more substantial pass-through coefficient. As these asymmetries are reduced over time, the economic performance should become more symmetric.
Finally, an overview of the results shows that the benefits from reacting to the exchange 33 The standard deviations reported in the table are in percentage terms. Interest rates and quarterly inflation are expressed in annualized terms. 34 Essentially, the average loss function for the 2 countries under a simple Taylor Rule is 11% higher (14% higher) than the average loss function for the two countries under Open Economy Rule 1 (Open Economy Rule 2). rate mainly accrue to the EMU, the economy more sensitive to movements in the exchange rate.
This indicates that there are clear gains to the EMU in this model from independent reaction to exchange rate movements.
Optimal Policy Rules: Non-Cooperative Case
For expositional ease, a description of the derivation of the optimal policy is not provided. Instead performance results of both the optimal policy under commitment and the optimal policy under discretion are provided for use simply as benchmarks. 35 The optimal policy under commitment diverges from the optimal policy under discretion in the presence of forward-looking variables. 36 When the policy maker makes her decision, the forward-looking variables are not predetermined, their values are influenced by her actions. As a result, for any policy path to be optimal, the shadow prices of the forward-looking variables must be zero at the time of the decision. 37 In the case of the optimal policy under commitment, the shadow prices of the forward-looking variables will diverge from zero after the decision period; their path is described by a difference equation obtained from the policy maker's maximization decision.
Since these shadow prices are predetermined variables, the optimal policy under commitment will be a feedback rule on all the state variables and these shadow prices. For this reason, the optimal policy under commitment has a more complicated form than the optimal policy under discretion.
In the absence of a credible commitment mechanism, this optimal rule will not be sustainable. Future policy makers will find it in their best interest to re-optimize so that the current shadow prices of the forward-looking variables are reset to zero. In fact, in the discretionary case, where the policy maker is free to re-optimize, the shadow prices of the forward-looking variables will always be zero. In the discretionary case, each policy maker's task is to decide on the appropriate monetary policy taking the other's actions as given. While there are many types of equilibria 38 possible in this setting the focus is traditionally restricted to finding a Markov perfect equilibrium, where each policy maker takes the other's decision to be a given function of only the current state variables of the system. In this particular model, the optimal linear regulator problem that needs to be solved in order to calculate this solution is more complicated than the standard case because of the presence of the term E tÛt+1 , the expected value of the policy variable in the future. 39 The technique presented in Svensson(2000) is used for handling this extra term in deriving the solution.
35 See Soderlind(1998) and Klein(1998) for an informative exposition of the derivation of the optimal policy under commitment.
36 See Kydland & Prescott(1977) , Oudiz & Sachs(1984) and Currie & Levine(1985) . 37 Otherwise, the policy maker can further reduce the value of the contemporaneous loss function by changing the value of the choice variable.
38 See Oudiz & Sachs(1985) for a discussion. 39 This term enters because of the assumed two period lag in the effect of policy on domestic inflation.
Results and Analysis
The reaction coefficients for the optimal discretionary policy are presented in Table 14 . 40 The discretionary solution, though complicated, conforms with intuition. Policy makers in both countries raise interest rates when either the output gap, expected inflation or current inflation increase. The response to inflation is muted relative to a simple policy rule but the policy makers compensate by reacting to a host of other state variables. Policymakers also tend to raise interest rates whenever output or inflation increase in the other country. One possible explanation for this result is that U.S. policy makers, for example, realizing that economic conditions warrant an increase in European rates, raise U.S. interest rates to keep the European currency from appreciating and passing on the inflationary burden to the U.S.
The reaction coefficient for the lagged real exchange rate is negative for the U.S. and positive for Europe. This is because a real depreciation of the dollar last period, all else equal, brings about a real appreciation this period as the real exchange rate reverts to its mean. This would immediately put inflationary pressure on Europe and ease inflationary pressure on the U.S. The U.S. therefore lowers rates while Europe raises rates in response to an increase in q t−1 . 41 Finally, policy makers raise interest rates in the U.S. and lower them in Europe when the risk premium increases. An increase in the risk premium leads to a currency outflow and a subsequent real depreciation of the dollar, necessitating a rate increase in the U.S. to stabilize inflation. Table 15 compares the volatility of the goal variables and the values of the loss function for the optimal solutions under discretion and commitment to the simple rules considered earlier.
As expected, the best performance occurs under the optimal policy under commitment. The discretionary solution also outperforms any commitment to a simple rule. The intuition underlying this result is that a number of state variables are ignored by the simple rules, mostly for practical reasons. Overall the optimal policy rules yield about 40% better performance than the best simple policy rules.
Solving the Model: Cooperative Case
In the cooperative setting, the two policy makers pick the optimal reaction coefficients in simple policy rules that maximize the joint economic performance of the two economies. Results, and specific details about the solution mechanisms are outlined in the sections below.
Simple Policy Rules: Cooperative Case
The period loss function of the joint policy makers is assumed to be of the form:
40 These reaction coefficients emphasize the difficulty of creating a commitment mechanism that can enforce the optimal policy under commitment, which surpasses even the discretionary policy in complexity.
41 Note that the current real exchange rate is not a state variable and does not appear in the discretionary solution.
As before, the weights on the volatility of output and inflation in the loss function are chosen to be equal with a smaller weight placed on the interest rate smoothing term. Given the roughly equal size of the populations and the economies in the EMU and the United States, an egalitarian stance about the nature of the cooperative relationship is taken in keeping the weights on each country's macroeconomic variables equal.
As before, the period loss function can be rewritten in terms of a set of goal variablesŶ t aŝ
The goal variables can be expressed as a function of the state variables in the system:
The period loss function of the joint policy makers an also be written aŝ
Recall also that the dynamic path of the economy is
The calculation of the performance of a simple policy rule is almost identical to the noncooperative case. The policy makers BOTH commit to following a simple rule of the formÛ t = fX t ≡ FẐ t where F = [fĝ]. 42 As before, I first show how to calculate the loss for a given simple rule, i.e. a given F. The optimized simple rule of a particular type can be found by searching over the reaction coefficients of that type of rule to find values that minimize the loss function.
The forward-looking variables at time t+1 are also endogenously determined functions of the state variablesx t+1 = H t+1Xt+1 . By substitutingx t+1 = H t+1Xt+1 andÛ t =fX t into the dynamic path of the economy, the following relationship emerges between the forward-looking variables and the predetermined variables for the two economies:
Given an initial value for H t+1 , the above equations are iterated on to solve for H t , which describes the relationship between the forward-looking variables and the predetermined variables given the policy rule F t .
Once H t is calculated, calculating the value of the loss function is relatively straightforward.
Note that the following method is also used to find the value of the loss function in the discretionary case. For a given F t , the dynamic path of the economy is given by
By partitioning the M matrix appropriately and using the fact thatx t = HX t , the dynamic path of the predetermined variables can be written aŝ
Then the variance-covariance matrix of the predetermined variables is given by
Similarly, the goal variables can be expressed as a function of the predetermined variables alone:
The variance of the goal variables is given by vec ΣŶŶ = C ⊗C vec (Σ υυ ) .
The value of the loss function can be calculated by weighting these variances appropriately.
Results and Analysis
The resulting optimal coefficients of the three types of simple policy rules in the cooperative case are given in Table 11 and Table 12 .
The results are very similar to the non-cooperative case. Once again the optimal Taylor
Rule for the U.S. and the EMU have high reaction coefficients on domestic inflation. The EMU's reaction coefficient on output continues to be very small. 43 Unlike in the U.S. which had reaction coefficients higher than in a basic Taylor Rule for both inflation and output, the reaction in the EMU seems to occur mostly to inflation. The EMU policy maker continues to react strongly to domestic inflation while ignoring output fluctuations. The reaction to external variables remains larger for the more open economy, the EMU.
Finally, Table 13 calculates the value of the loss function for each of the simple rules in the cooperative case. Results from the non-cooperative section carry over to the cooperative section;
Open Economy Rule 1 continues to yield about 11% better performance than a simple Taylor
Rule while Open Economy Rule 2 continues to yield about 14% better performance. Once again these apparent gains from reacting to external variables pale compared to the optimized Taylor Rule: model specific fine tuning of reactions to domestic variables contribute the lion's share of performance improvement. Finally, the asymmetric performance of the two economies remains: the EMU consistently underperforms the U.S.
Optimal Policy Rules: Cooperative Case
The reaction coefficients for the optimal policy rules in the cooperative case are given in Table 16 .
Policy makers in both countries react strongly to current output and to a lesser degree to inflation and expected inflation. The EMU's reaction to U.S. inflation and the output gap is less strong under cooperation than under non-cooperation. Furthermore, the U.S. clearly shows a greater interest in exchange rate related fluctuations in the cooperative environment. These findings seem to indicate that the EMU may have more to gain from a cooperative regime as the U.S. policy maker internalizes the impact of her policy decisions on the EMU through the joint loss function.
The benchmark performance of these optimal policy rules are given in Table 17 . The results found in the non-cooperative section seem to carry over into this section. Once again, the commitment solution yields the best results while the discretionary solution outperforms any commitment to a simple rule. The overall performance gap between the optimal policy rules and the best simple policy rules is about 40%.
The Gains From Cooperation
Similarity of the gains from using policy rules with external variables in the cooperative and noncooperative cases suggests that the gains from cooperation must be small. The total loss function declines only negligibly when shifting from a non-cooperative to a cooperative environment. The results in Table 18 compares the loss functions in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases; it confirms that the overall gains from cooperation are small.
When the loss function for the cooperative case is disaggregated we see that the U.S. benefits from cooperation only under an optimized Taylor Rule, and even then by very little. For the most part, the U.S. loses under policy cooperation while the EMU benefits. The intuition for this result is that in a non-cooperative regime, the more open economy is likely to suffer more from exchange rate fluctuations. Under policy cooperation, the U.S. will pay closer attention to the impact of its policy decisions on the exchange rate, and to the resulting impact on the EMU. As a result the U.S. may make itself slightly worse off (perhaps by not being as aggressive to move rates) in order to improve the joint welfare by making the EMU better off by a proportionally greater amount.
The bottom line still is that the overall gains from cooperation are small, and may not be sufficient to galvanize policy makers into cooperation. Finally, there is a noticeable asymmetry in the macroeconomic outcomes of the two countries: the loss function for the EMU is always higher than for the United States. This asymmetry is driven by a larger import share, a more significant impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the CPI (higher pass-through), a greater volatility of shocks to inflation and more persistent inflation.
The degree of asymmetry may decrease as the EMU matures; less uncertainty and improved central bank policies, for example, may reduce the volatility and persistence of inflation. If these changes occur, we would see more symmetric economic outcomes in the two countries. The model presented in this chapter can then be used to identify the appropriate policies that policy makers of the two largest economies in the world should follow as they move into the 21st century.
A Derivation of State-Space Representation
The 18 equations that describe the dynamic path of the economy can be written in a more compact matrix notation using ei to denote a 1*18 row vector which is all zeros except for a 1 in the ith position. Λ0, Λ1 and Λ5 are all 18*18 matrices, Λ2 and Λ3 are both 18*2 matrices and Λ4 is an 18*6 matrix.
Λ0
X t+1 Etxt+1 = Λ1Ẑt + Λ2Ût + Λ3EtÛt+1 + Λ4Ŵt + Λ5υt+1
The matrices of coefficients in the above equation can be expressed as 
Rewrite the vector of variablesŴt as 
where the reduced form coefficients are related to the structural coefficients in the following manner.
B Description of Data and Sources
Data for the 10 EMU countries and the United States were obtained from the following sources.
• Real and Nominal GDP for West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the United States was obtained from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts. (Note: Data for Germany, Austria and Finland had to be seasonally adjusted).
• Real GDP data for Portugal was obtained from the International Financial Statistics. This data was only available from 1988:1 to 1998:4. When aggregating output gaps for the period 1981:1 to 1987:4, the weights were readjusted with the weight for Portugal omitted.
• Quarterly GDP data was not available from either source for Ireland and Belgium. Industrial Production data and Producer Price Index data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics was used for Belgium and Ireland.
• Interest rate data were taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. In most cases a 10 year government bond rate was used.
• Nominal exchange rate information was taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics
C Derivation of the Period Loss Functions in the Non Cooperative Case
The period loss function for the Home country can be expressed in terms of a set of goal variables Yt as: Lt = Y t KYt where
Similarly, the period loss function for the Foreign country can be expressed as a function of their goal variables Y * t as:
where
Yt and Y * t can be expressed as functions of the state variables and the choice variables, Yt = CzẐt + CuÛt and
The matrices CZ and C * Z are both 3*18 matrices while Cu and C * u are both 3*2 matrices. These matrices can be defined as:
The period loss function of the Home policy maker, rewritten in terms of the state variables and the choice variables are
Similarly, the period loss function of the Foreign policy maker is
D The Period Loss Function in the Cooperative Case
The period loss function can be expressed in terms of a set of goal variablesŶt is:Lt =Ŷ t KŶt wherê
Yt can be expressed as a function of the state variables and the choice variables,Ŷt = CzẐt + CuÛt. The matrix CZ is a 6*18 matrix and the matrix Cu is a 6*2 matrix defined as: Instruments: y t−1 to y t−3 , r t−2 to r t−4 , r * t−2 to r * t−4 , q t−1 to q t−3 . 
